美国的金融系统有多可怕？

众所周知，美国这个国家已经被金融系统所**。在美国旅居数十年的复旦大学学者陈平教授在一档节目中公开讲出：“美国为首的虚拟经济规模大到什么程度？是美国GDP的30到50倍，是世界GDP的8到10倍。”

这是什么意思呢？美国的金融已经彻底地**了实体经济。陈平教授解释说：“这就相当于美国这个国家如果有一个人在努力工作的情况下，有30到50个人在押宝这个人他赚还是赔。你说他们这种**跟实体经济有关系吗？”

陈平教授进一步解释：“不但没关系，而且是吸血鬼。把实体经济里面最优秀的数学家、物理学家、工程师全都吸收到金融系统中玩游戏去了。”

我们再来通过美国内部的发声来细品美国内部对金融系统的监管：美国国会山评论文章锐评美国联邦银行监管系统：权利不受限制，形同虚设

（本文的英文全文在文末供大家参考。）

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作者简介：

布莱恩·奈特（Brian Knight）是乔治梅森大学墨卡特斯中心（Mercatus Center）的创新与治理主任和高级研究员。Thomas Hoenig是墨卡特斯中心的杰出高级研究员，联邦存款保险**（FDIC）的前副**，堪萨斯城联邦储备银行前总裁兼首席执行官。

联邦存款保险**（FDIC）的前副**，堪萨斯城联邦储备银行前总裁兼首席执行官Thomas Hoenig

联邦银行监管机构不受制约的权力

对银行业有无限的监管权，却对自己没有任何独立的监管

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation联邦存款保险**（FDIC）已经切除了其对银行活动做出的重大监督决定的独立审查制度。这是一个问题。为什么？因为联邦存款保险**是联邦政府中更强大的机构之一，对银行业进行几乎无限的监管。

联邦存款保险**扮演的监督角色中是工具性的，它监督银行以发现并预防对其安全的威胁。虽然过去大多数的监管是合格的，但有时它也会犯错误，亦或银行家和监管者之间会出现合理的意见分歧。此外，这一**往往不透明，不幸的是，联邦存款保险****有时在试图控制从事合法但不受欢迎的活动的行业时被滥用。过去，这导致了诉讼和一些令人不安的承认，即联邦存款保险**未能坚持其政策。

监管无法规，可以随意主导“最终解释权”

监督之所以如此强大，却又如此令人担忧的地方是因为涉及的**和监督如此之少。联邦存款保险****可以参考模糊的联邦机构指导语言，而不是法律法规或具有约束力的规则，以阻止银行从事不利的活动。银行知道，如果他们不遵守，联邦存款保险**则可能会在没有可能在法庭上受到质疑的正式行动的情况下使事情**困难。银行也认识到与包括联邦存款保险**在内的监管机构**良好关系的重要性，很少挑战该机构。

监管**会成员由自己的董事担任**并任命成员

认识到银行监管带来的挑战，国会于1994年授权联邦银行监管机构，包括联邦存款保险**，建立内部独立上诉程序，银行可以对审查员认为是重大监管结果的上诉。从 1995 年到 2019 年，联邦存款保险**以各种配置使用了监督上诉审查**会 the Supervisory Appeals Review Committee（SARC）。SARC由联邦存款保险**的三名内部董事之一组成，他担任另外两名董事的**和代表。如果有空缺，**可以任命其他人填补空缺。

这种安排仍然存在问题。虽然审查监督决定的**通常与负责监督的**处于不同的报告链中，但他们仍然依赖于与其他工作人员**关系。此外，如果争议涉及FDIC领导层的监管或监督议程，SARC的**可能会发现自己在判断自己的政策。最后，在美国目前这样的情况下，FDIC只有一名内部董事，该董事将能够选择谁是SARC**会的成员。

修订**序，但最终又被带回过去的结构了。

为了解决这个问题，联邦存款保险**于2021年成立了监管上诉办公室the Office of Supervisory Appeals （OSA），这是一个真正独立的办公室，由具有银行监管**的前政府雇员组成。不幸的是，今年3月，联邦存款保险**宣布了转变，回归到了SARC结构。在进行更改之前，它甚至没有征求公众意见，尽管它确实在进行更改后开放了一个简短的评论期。

我们等人反对这一变化及其完成**。这一变化使上诉程序的独立性和可信度**，这对于FDIC正确完成其重要工作的能力至关重要。该**阻止了有意义的反馈。也许是为了解决回归（SARC）结构的明显不足，联邦存款保险**最近宣布将做出一些额外的小改动，并开启了另一个简短的评论期。

虽然最新的提案比FDIC最初的回归略有改进，但它仍然不够。一个真正独立的办公室已经一去不复返了，取而代之的是有问题的旧系统。虽然最新的提案**了FDIC的**员（作为无投票权的成员），但**员无权采取行动，并向**报告，**是监督的**管理层。因此，没有理由认为这将给上诉程序带来必要的独立性。

由此可以看出，美国对银行业的监管，可以说是形同虚设。其根本原因是，金融业的从业人员就是金融业的监管人员，并且这种监管权力没有任何的其他权力来对其进行限制。

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has neutered its system of independent review for the material supervisory decisions it makes concerning banks’ activities. That is a problem. Why? Because the FDIC is, perhaps surprisingly, one of the more powerful agencies in the federal government with an almost unlimited regulatory oversight over banking.

One tool the FDIC uses in this oversight role is supervision, where it monitors banks to detect and preempt threats to their safety. While most supervision is no doubt done competently, there are times when mistakes are made, or when legitimate differences of opinion arise between banker and supervisor. Further, this process is often opaque and, unfortunately, is sometimes abused in attempts by FDIC officials to control industries engaged in legal-but-di**avored activities. In the past, this has led to lawsuits and some uncomfortable acknowledgments that the FDIC failed to uphold its policies.

What makes supervision so powerful, and so fraught, is how little process and oversight is involved. FDIC officials can reference vague federal agency guidance language, rather than a legal statute or binding rule, to discourage banks from engaging in di**avored activities. Banks know that if they don’t comply, the FDIC can make matters difficult without formal action that could be challenged in court. Banks also recognize the importance of having a good relationship with their supervisors, including the FDIC, and rarely challenge the agency.

Cognizant of the challenges posed by bank supervision, Congress mandated in 1994 that the federal banking regulators, including the FDIC, establish internal independent appeals processes where banks could appeal what examiners judged to be material supervisory findings. From 1995 to 2019, the FDIC used, in various configurations, the Supervisory Appeals Review Committee (SARC). The SARC was staffed by one of the FDIC’s three inside directors, who served as chair and representative of the other two. If there were vacancies, the chair could appoint others to fill the gap.

This arrangement still presented a problem. While the officials reviewing the supervisory decisions were usually in a different reporting chain than those doing the supervising, they were still dependent on maintaining relationships with the other staff. Further, to the extent that the dispute implicated the regulatory or supervisory agenda of FDIC leadership, the officials on the SARC may find themselves judging their own policies. Finally, in a situation like we are currently in, where there is only one inside director at the FDIC, that director would be able to choose who else sat on the SARC.

To address this, in 2021 the FDIC established the Office of Supervisory Appeals (OSA), which was to be a truly independent office staffed by former government employees with bank supervisory experience. Unfortunately, in March of this year, the FDIC announced an about-face, returning to the SARC structure. It did not even solicit public comment before making the change, though it did open up a short comment period after the change was made.

We, among others, opposed this change and how it was done. The change made the appeals process less independent and credible, which is vital to the FDIC’s ability to properly do its important job. The process prevented meaningful feedback. Perhaps to address the obvious weakness of returning to the SARC arrangement, the FDIC recently announced that it would make some additional minor changes and opened up another short comment period.

While the newest proposal is a slight improvement over the FDIC’s initial regression, it remains inadequate. Gone is a truly independent office, replaced with the problematic old system. While the latest proposal adds the FDIC’s ombud**an (as a non-voting member), the ombud**an is not empowered to act and reports to the chair, who is the most senior management over supervision. Thus, there is little reason to assume this will bring needed independence to the appeals process.

The FDIC’s work is too important to have its decisions languish under a cloud of suspicion. It needs to maintain credibility, which is best accomplished using an appeals process that is truly independent and staffed by knowledgeable, but neutral, officials. Restoring the OSA would benefit the FDIC and the banks it supervises, and it will improve the reliability of the review process and credibility of the institution.

Brian Knight is the director of innovation and governance and a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Thomas Hoenig is a Mercatus Center distinguished senior fellow, a former vice chairman with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and a former president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.